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• Four formal rounds of Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
(TPPA) negotiations took place in 2010. They involved over 
200 officials from Australia, the United States, New Zealand, 
Chile, Singapore, Brunei, Peru, Vietnam and Malaysia.
• Future negotiations officially are set to include three issues 
with public health and medicines policy implications for 
Australia and our region:
¾ ways to approach regulatory coherence and transparency;
¾ how to benefit multinational and small–medium 
enterprises; and
¾ multilateral investor–state dispute settlement.
• US-based multinational pharmaceutical companies are 
lobbying for TPPA provisions like those in the Australia–US 
Free Trade Agreement, which reduce government cost-
effectiveness regulatory control of pharmaceuticals, 
threatening equitable access to medicines.
• They also advocate increased TPPA intellectual monopoly 
privilege protection, which will further limit the development 
of Australian generic medicine enterprises and restrict patient 
access to cheap, bioequivalent prescription drugs.
• Of particular concern is that proposed TPPA multilateral 
investor–state dispute settlement procedures would allow 
US corporations (as well as those of other TPPA nations) to 
obtain damages against Australian governments through 
international arbitral proceedings if their investments are 
impeded by Australian public health and environment 
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tra
maT  Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) is a freede agreement (FTA) relic from the era of financialrkets deregulation, initiated by the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) just before the global financial crisis.1
Despite most developed economies now embracing re-regulation,
four formal rounds of TPPA negotiations took place in 2010
(Melbourne — March, San Francisco — June, Peru — August and
officials from
Brunei, Peru,
(as notified to
inology) with
Australia:
 enterprises
(SMEs); and
• improving multilateral “investor–state dispute settlement”.2
In this article, we seek to elucidate the likely content and impact
of these issues, chiefly by examining influential US industry
submissions to the USTR on the TPPA.
Ensuring regulatory coherence and transparency
The TPPA is a multilateral FTA. Similar multilateral FTAs influenc-
ing Australian domestic public health and medicines policies
include the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
(which required, for instance, increased pharmaceutical patent
terms under threat of trade sanctions) and the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (which allowed signatories to facilitate foreign
corporate ownership of, for example, hospital or dental services).3
More recently, bilateral US FTAs such as the Australia–US Free
Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) have included additional provisions
(known as “TRIPS-Plus” [or “Doha-Minus”]) influencing health
and medicines policy (Box 1).4
The US agenda in TPPA negotiations will be greatly influenced
by submissions made to the USTR by Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), the US patented pharmaceu-
tical lobby.5 PhRMA requested that the TPPA negotiations
address . . . market access barriers, remedy inadequate consulta-
tive mechanisms and transparency concerns in countries, like
New Zealand, for which no US FTA currently exists . . . [in
doing so this would] ensure that patients throughout the TPP
region receive safe, effective and innovative [emphasis added]
medicines.6
The above language (particularly the replacement of “cost-
effective” with “effective and innovative”) suggests that one aspect
of TPPA “regulatory coherence and transparency” negotiations (at
least from the US perspective) may involve incorporating into the
TPPA so-called TRIPS-Plus provisions (Box 1) from earlier bilateral
US FTAs. The contradictory relationship of such provisions with
the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health7 and their
potentially deleterious impacts on public health, have been docu-
mented by a World Health Organization commission.8 Australia
has already been exposed to these through the combined operation
of AUSFTA Chapter 17 (on intellectual monopoly privileges) and
Annex 2C (on changes to the Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits
Scheme [PBS]).9 The PhRMA TPPA submission also seeks provi-
sions ensuring its members’ intellectual monopoly privileges are
not “undermined by other government pricing and regulatory
mechanisms” (such as cost-effectiveness research [CER] and refer-
ence pricing systems) which it contentiously refers to as “non-
tariff” barriers to “innovative medicines”.6
The TPPA submission by the US patented pharmaceutical
company Novartis requests “enhanced cooperation among the TPP
participants’ respective drug authorities”, prevention of market
entry by substandard medicines, as well as a Medical Devices and
Pharmaceuticals Working Group to facilitate ongoing private
sector lobbying.10 This raises concern, as the AUSFTA similarly
created a Medicines Working Group that arguably promoted
changes to the reference-pricing system of Australia’s PBS.4
Benefiting multinationals and small–medium enterprises
In its efforts to promote the interests of US multinationals and
SMEs, PhRMA continues to recommend that the governments ofer 2 • 17 January 2011 83
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USTR’s Special 301 Watch List because their domestic legislation
allegedly inadequately protects US pharmaceutical patents and
interests.11 A recent PhRMA submission to the USTR on this
Watch List seeks to have Australia placed on it due a variety of
matters including Australia’s failure to regularly convene the
AUSFTA medicines policy lobby group.12
PhRMA also protested about the impact on its corporate mem-
bers of Australia’s “anti-evergreening” amendments to the Thera-
peutic Goods Act 1989 (Cwlth) that were passed as a condition of
AUSFTA coming into force, as well as against the possibility that
the Australian Patents Act 1990 (Cwlth) might be amended to allow
the manufacture of generic medicines for export to international
markets where relevant patents have expired early.12 It is clear,
however, that both the above measures breach no TRIPS obliga-
tions and promote the interest of Australian biotechnology and
generic medicines SMEs.
Australia and other non-US TPPA nations could argue that the
interests of their pharmaceutical and health-related SMEs would
benefit if the TPPA defined pharmaceutical “innovation” (as it was
in Annex 2C of the AUSFTA) on the basis of objectively demon-
strated therapeutic significance assessed through the operation of
science-based CER systems, as well as by the operation of compet-
itive markets facilitated by strong anti-monopoly laws.
To benefit Australian public health and environmental policy,
the TPPA should:
• expand the compulsory licensing exceptions that allow drug
patents to be broken (with reasonable compensation) by local
generic SMEs in a public health emergency;
• allow “springboarding” by Australian generic medicine SMEs
on patent expiry, as well as export under patent; and
• permit the research use exemption that allows publicly funded
Australian university researchers to experiment with the chemistry
of drugs or other health-related technologies that are in patent
without having to pay royalties.
Improving multilateral investor–state dispute settlement
Philip Morris (PM), a multinational tobacco company, lodged a
submission with the USTR about the TPPA that outlined concerns
over Australia’s move toward plain packaging of cigarette pack-
ets.13,14 PM stated in its TPPA submission that plain packaging of
cigarettes, if adopted, would amount to expropriation of intellec-
tual property rights in its trademark, “limit the freedom of
commercial free speech, significantly restrict competition and
breach Australia’s obligations under the WTO TRIPS Agree-
ment”.13 As a result, PM sought an investor–state dispute settle-
ment provision in the TPPA that would allow it to sue governments
that introduced legislation that impeded the investments of foreign
corporations.15
Investor–state provisions appeared in the 1994 North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the US, Canada and
Mexico.16 Concerns about such provisions were a major reason for
the failure of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment in 1998.17
Despite this, investor–state clauses have now become a controver-
sial part of bilateral investment treaties and over 300 investor–state
dispute settlement cases have been decided.18 Such provisions
grant investors covered by them a right to initiate dispute-
settlement proceedings for damages in international arbitration
proceedings against foreign governments impeding their
investments19 without having to first seek damages in domestic
courts.20 The lawyers controlling such arbitral proceedings are
appointed and paid at the behest of the parties and do not
necessarily take account of domestic public health and environ-
ment protections, creating a pro-investor jurisprudence.18
Investor–state challenges have occurred against a broad spec-
trum of public health and environmental protection legislation and
policies.21 Examples include regulation against carcinogenic sub-
stances including chemicals that cause developmental disability,22
neurotoxins,23 dangerous lawn pesticides24 and carcinogenic gaso-
line additives.25 Also impugned have been statutes on water
protection,26 waste disposal27 and waste treatment.28 Canada has
been sued under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA because its universal
health care system allegedly interferes with US health care invest-
ment.29 A Canadian generic pharmaceutical company has used the
same provisions to sue the US because its legal system promoted
“evergreening”.30 A US ban on cattle with suspected bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (“mad cow disease”) was also the
subject of an investor–state claim.31
Conclusion
Australian TPPA negotiators have a responsibility both to this
nation and our developing neighbours to promote regulatory
coherence on CER and measures encouraging public health-
related (eg, biotechnology and renewable energy) start-up SMEs.
They have an equally strong obligation to resist the extension of
TRIPS-Plus (Doha-Minus) and multilateral investor–state dispute
settlement provisions (Box 2).
1 “TRIPS-Plus” (“Doha-Minus”) provisions from United 
States bilateral free trade agreements
• Linkage evergreening: drug safety regulators notify patent holder 
of impending generic entrant to the market — facilitates pro-
monopolistic and anti-competitive strategies against generic 
medicines.
• Data exclusivity: may inhibit generic companies from using data 
on patented medicines submitted to safety regulators even to 
prepare for rapid launch upon patent expiry (“springboarding”) 
or satisfy compulsory licensing.
• Anti-parallel importation: prohibits re-importation of medicines 
made cheaper by the drug regulatory system of another nation.
• Compulsory licensing restrictions: limit the situations under which, 
in public health emergencies, governments can grant licences to 
generic companies to rapidly produce necessary medicines with 
minimal compensation to the patent holder.
• Anti-reference pricing provisions: in the guise of promoting the 
“competitive markets” rather than alternate “objectively 
demonstrated therapeutic significance” approach to assessing 
pharmaceutical “innovation” (both specified in Annex 2C.1 of 
the AUSFTA) — limit the capacity of governments to establish 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme-type cost-effectiveness 
assessment and central government price negotiation systems 
for new health technologies.
• Patent extension for delayed marketing approval — even when 
delay due to inadequate information presented to safety 
regulators.
TRIPS = Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. 
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the AUSFTA negotiations where an investor–state clause was
expressly excluded. Considerable academic objections also exist to
the expansion of multilateral investor–state arbitration as an
undemocratic infringement on domestic sovereignty with consid-
erable risks to public health and the environment.33 The Australian
government appears aware of the risks. In answer to an opinion
piece about the TPPA by the authors of this article, the then
Australian Trade Minister Simon Crean wrote:
It is wrong to suggest that we are about to re-open obligations
in relation to the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme that were
settled in the 2005. If there are to be any changes to the scheme
in the future, it would be part of a domestic policy debate in
Australia . . . we have serious reservations about the inclusion of
investor–state dispute settlement provision in this agreement.
We do not want new layers of red tape under the guise of trade
liberalization. Australian negotiators will make this clear . . .34
It is to be hoped in the interests of Australian public health and
environment protection that these sentiments prevail.
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